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% RECENT CASES
however, applies only to original parties to the note and to those.,with
notice that there is a contemporaneously executed instrument.5 But,
the weight of authority looks only to the face of the note to determine
negotiability, unless the note is expressly conditioned on the con-
temporaneous instrument.6
Texas, the jurisdiction where the instant case arose, hasfconsistent-
ly rejected the doctrine that contemporaneously written instruments
should be read together, and has followed the general weight of
authority.7 Contemporaneous agreements between persons not original
parties to the note have been treated separately in determining the
rights of the holder of the note,8 and have not affected the negotiablity,
of the note.
The court in the instant case disregarded this past interpretation
of the law, and not only attempted to apply the doctrine of con-
temporaneously written instruments, but extended it to a holder who,
is not an original party to the note.9 The court did not hold that re-
quiring the certificate of installation was an indication of bad faith,10
but entered into the fiction that the holder was an original party to
the note and, therefore, a party to a nonnegotiable instrument. This
decision not only conflicts with earlier Texas authority," but is an
application of law resulting in further impairment of free circulatiop
of negotiable instruments, and seems contrary to the Negotiable In-
struments Law.
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Neb. 287, 91 N.W. 399 (1902); Garnett v. Meyers, 65 Neb. 287, 91 N.W. 400 (1902);
Linder v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 139 Neb. 636, 298 N.W. 545 (1941); Munch
v. Cent. West Publishing Serv. Co., 128 Neb. 645, 259 N.W. 736 (1935).
5For a general criticism of the whole doctrine of contemporaneous instru-
ments, see Aigler, Negotiable Instruments, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 491 (1928);
Bailey, Negotiable Instruments, 13 Texas L. Rev. 278 (1935); Note, 14 Texas
L. Rev. 307 (1936).
1Powell & Powell v. Greenlief & Courrier, 104 Vt. 480, 162 AtI 377 (1932);
Perth Amboy Trust v. Moden School Ass'n, 9 N.J. Misc. 368, 154 Atl. 418 (Dist.
Ct. 1931); Utah Lake Irrig. Co. v. Allen, 64 Utah 511, 231 Pac. 818 (1924); Con-
tinental Guaranty Corp. v. People's Bus Line, 1 Harr. 595, 117 Atl. 275 (Del.
1922); Equitable Trust Co. v. Warger, 258 Ill. 615, 102 N.E. 209 (1913); Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law § 3(2).
7Continental Nat. Bank v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948);
Arrington v. Mercantile Protective Bureau, 24 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Comm. App.
1930); Lozano v. Myers, 18 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Mountjoy Parts
Co. v. San Antonio Nat. Bank, 12 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
8 Cf. Slay v. Wheeler, 84 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Lange v. Curtin;
11 Cal. App.2d 161, 53 P.2d 185 (1936).
' See Continental Nat. Bank v. Connor, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948)
(cited by instant case, but holds contrary).
1 0Although the court might have used this line of attack, the overwhelming
weight of authority holds that knowledge of executory consideration is not
bad faith, Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 56. Also see cases cited in
Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 788 (7th ed. 1948).
"Supra note 7.
